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There are many things to be said in favor of the argument presented in the 
essay, “The Drama of the Leap: Kaspar Hauser Exits the Cave,” as well as many 
critical points to be raised. As an illustration of the last matter, I do not agree with 
the one-sided presentation of Immanuel Kant’s ideas on education in the essay. It is 
said that Kant positions the newborn child amongst the animals and that he defines 
education as a gradual process of rooting out the merely biological side of human life. 
Yet, Kant is also famous for formulating what is known as the pedagogical paradox: 
we can only help children in becoming autonomous beings if we assume that they 
already possess a minimal degree of freedom. Animals, for this reason, cannot be 
educated, only trained.1 This is clearly reflected by the different ways in which we 
deal with children when reprimanding or punishing them, as opposed to the ways 
in which we discipline animals. Therefore, Kant is well aware of the fact that from 
the very beginning, there is a tension within every human being between freedom 
and necessity, between culture and nature. I would say that this is not sufficiently 
reflected in the essay. 
On the other hand, the essay is most successful in giving an original twist to the 
old Kantian problem. I believe the author is correct in pointing out, in the first three 
schemes she discusses, that we — as heirs to Kant and the Enlightenment — usually 
regard freedom as an end goal, and therefore run the risk of turning education into 
an instrument for attaining this objective. What the essay shows is that freedom 
could also be seen as the name of education itself. Or, at least, that is the way I have 
understood the fourth scheme. This is also to say that, rather than overcoming the 
tensions as described by Kant, education is precisely about accepting and working 
through these tensions — even about remaining in the center of these tensions. Ed-
ucation doesn’t happen as the result of passing over from childhood to adulthood. 
Instead, education happens in the moment of passing over itself.
In order to substantiate this claim, the essay uses a most commendable approach, 
namely, it constructs an argument on the basis of a discussion of, let’s call it, a case 
study. Indeed, Kaspar Hauser offers an excellent starting point for thinking about 
the ways in which learning how to speak isn’t just one skill one needs to master in 
addition to other skills, but is absolutely essential to what it means to become an 
educated being. An analysis of the elementary gestures of leaping and leaving, as 
we see these happening in the protagonist’s endeavor with becoming a speaking 
human being, brings out profound insights about the issue of freedom in education. 
This is to say that, even if Kaspar’s case is most uncommon, it reveals something 
about all of us. More adequately put, because of its exceptionality (receiving his 
first education at an adult age), Kaspar renders things visible in a much clearer and 
articulate way than a mere reflection on our own education ever could. The basic 
idea here is that most of us, because we are fluent in our mother tongue, tend to 
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disregard the fact that, even as grown-ups, every word we utter is a struggle with 
language. And so we might easily miss the fact that it is this never-ending process 
of entering into language that transforms us into beings of possibility, into creatures 
that can truly begin anew. 
Now, the force of this argument is that it remains at a descriptive level and that 
it relies on the use of Werner Herzog’s outstanding portrayal of Kaspar Hauser’s 
leapings and leavings. Thus, we can come to recognize that we are all Kaspar, by 
comparing our own experiences with the analysis offered. In this sense, the approach 
displayed in the essay could be rightfully called phenomenological. Nonetheless, 
this descriptive perspective is crossed by other purposes that I would call normative 
and ontological. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that the text relies too much 
on the story of Kaspar’s life, by which I mean that, at different places in the essay, 
particular narrative elements are taken as indicative for what education should and 
should not be. I refer here more specifically to the clash between what the citizens 
of Nuremberg had expected (namely, Kaspar writing an authentic and complete life 
story) and his failure to do so, which resulted in his most infelicitous death. This 
abrupt and unprosperous turn is then indicative of a shortcoming, identified as a 
“hopeless nihilism and skepticism.” There is, otherwise stated, something that is 
lacking in his story. Kaspar’s biography is judged normatively as incomplete, and, 
therefore, it is the ambition of the essay to fill the gap and to come up with a better 
account. In order to do so, the author draws from Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc 
Nancy. More precisely, she advocates an ontological account that does not regard 
freedom as an attribute of humankind. Instead, humanity is defined as an attribute 
of freedom. We become free only by giving the right answer to a groundless ground, 
to a play of disclosure and concealing that radically precedes us.
The difficulty I have with this is that Kaspar Hauser is being reduced to an object 
of evaluation. His life can be either a good example or a bad one, or perhaps both. 
Pointing out what is deficient about his story, Kaspar runs the risk of becoming an 
individual and a problematic case, which, like a medical case, can be evaluated in 
view of an ideal of the healthy, the desirable. In a sense, this comes down to not 
taking his case seriously. Moreover, this evaluation is supported by an ontology that, 
although I am not unsympathetic to it myself, might not convince others. However, 
such an ontological grounding, even if it involves a groundless ground, may not be 
necessary at all in order to show that Kaspar Hauser is of great relevance for educa-
tionalists. My advice is to remain at a purely descriptive, that is, phenomenological 
level, and more precisely to develop a precise, rich, and convincing account of how 
freedom in education is related to becoming a linguistic being, and to the leaping 
and leaving that is involved here.
I would like to suggest adding another figure here, and another gesture to leaping 
and leaving, namely, swimming. If this sounds odd at first, I refer here to a book by 
the French philosopher Michel Serres, The Troubadour of Knowledge, in which he 
presents education as a risky voyage from the familiar to the strange with the help 
of the figure of a swimmer who crosses a large distance from one shore to the other.2 
He compares the true educational moment with what this swimmer experiences right 
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in the midst of crossing over (rather than when the swimmer reaches the other side). 
I quote here from Serres: “After having left the shore behind, for a while you stay 
much closer to it than the one on the other side, at least just enough so that the body 
starts reckoning and says to itself, silently, that it can always go back … You have 
not really left.” During the second half of the journey, there comes a moment when 
“your foot … waits expectantly for the approach: you find yourself close enough to 
the steep bank to say you have arrived.” Even if you haven’t actually arrived, you 
have at least the feeling of arriving. However, “right bank or left bank, what does it 
matter, in both cases it is land or ground.”3 The most interesting moment is somewhere 
in between departing and arriving, a moment that is difficult to define, but which you 
must necessarily experience: “The real passage occurs in the middle,” that is, when 
“the ground is missing [and] any sense of belonging, of support is gone,”4 when you 
find yourself in dangerous waters.
This metaphor perceptively captures, I would say, what it means to define educa-
tion-as-freedom in the sense of being entirely without destination. Even if it is difficult 
to forego a language of processes that go from one fixed point to another whenever 
one speaks about education, this transformation is — at a deeper level — dependent 
upon an undefined and (perhaps) unsettling place somewhere in between where one 
is neither departing nor arriving, and where the student witnesses, temporarily, a 
moment of disorientation. But, this sense of disorientation shouldn’t be regarded as 
negative, that is, as something to be regretted or to be against in view of the safety 
that both shores offered. Rather, it should be taken in a wholly positive sense: as an 
experience of ability that is not as yet determined and that forms the basis of our 
educability, of our very potentiality to be educated, to begin anew.
1.  Immanuel Kant, “Lectures on Pedagogy (1803),” in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and 
Education, eds. Gunter Zoller and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
2. Michel Serres, The Troubadour of Knowledge, trans. Sheila F. Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1997).
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